My ideal interpretation of the Religion Clause is that it should be seen as one singular clause, and not broken up into two between the Establishment and Free Religion Clauses. The simplest way to put this interpretation is "government shall neither favor nor disfavor religion". This includes multiple religions against each other, and any religion against irreligion.
Splitting this up into two, in my opinion, has resulted in some unfortunate and bad rulings. I'll start with the Free Exercise Clause, and specifically
Sherbert v. Verner. This ruling allowed people to argue for exemptions from laws on religious grounds, and set up a test very similar to strict scrutiny on Equal Protection clauses at that. I think this was a horrible decision that perverted the Religion Clause as a whole, as government now had to favor religion over irreligion in exemptions from law.
Thankfully, the Court recognized its error and overturned
Sherbert in
Employment Division v. Smith, removing this exemption from neutrally applied laws. Unfortunately,
Smith came down at a time when there was considerable sympathy for religion both on the left (for protecting historically oppressed religions) and the right (for protecting traditional Christianity). This union regrettably resulted in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which reinstated the
Sherbert test statutorily instead of constitutionally. The federal RFRA was ruled unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments in
City of Boerne v. Flores, but majority did so on separation of powers grounds, not Religion Clause grounds. This resulted in a lot of state RFRAs being passed, many of them even worse than the federal one (
hello, Indiana).
However, John Paul Stevens's concurrence in
Boerne was short and absolutely perfect to demonstrate why all RFRAs should be unconstitutional:
John Paul Stevens wrote:In my opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a "law respecting an establishment of religion" that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.
Moving onto the Establishment Clause side, I think that what 4/5 mentioned with the third prong of the
Lemon test is indeed problematic and unnecessary. I don't think there's any need to get into "entanglement" if you just stick to what I've laid out as applying "government shall neither favor nor disfavor religion".
Given that, I think that any sort of government orchestration of religion is a violation. There are obvious things like
school prayer, but I go even more radical and would agree with Michael Newdow that it should forbid other things like adding "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance, "In God We Trust" on currency, or
using prayer in an invocation for government proceedings.
However, under the same token, I think that if the government is going to offer benefits under the law, it cannot disfavor religious applicants over irreligious ones. Which means that (drum roll) I actually think in
the case being argued at SCOTUS tomorrow that 4/5 mentioned, Espinoza should win. But since this post is long enough as is, I'll hold off explaining why in more detail until we digest this a bit.